

**FEBRUARY 2026**

## **The Effects of Federal Immigration Enforcement on Private Sector Employment in Six States and Washington, D.C.**

### **SUMMARY**

The UC Merced Community and Labor Center analyzed US Current Population Survey (CPS) data during the first year of the second Trump administration, and found that periods of escalated immigration enforcement operations were associated with state-level downturns in the number of persons reporting having worked in the private sector. These patterns diverged from broader national trends, and in most cases were unusual or unprecedented compared with historical data.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

In the first year of the second Trump presidency, from January 2025 to January 2026, overall private sector employment in states targeted by escalated enforcement operations (“enforcement states”) declined by -1.8%, while the rest of the US experienced a 1.1% increase. In terms of numbers of workers, enforcement states (Tennessee, California, Oregon, Washington D.C., Illinois, Louisiana and Minnesota) experienced a net decline of -521,593 persons reporting having worked in the private sector work, while the rest of the US experienced a gain of 1,162,741.

Moreover, in enforcement states, declines in the number of private sector workers were associated with specific escalation periods, such as those coinciding with named operations. Enforcement states, as a whole, experienced private sector worker gains (176,992) before escalations, declines (-1,513,699) during escalation periods, and rebounds (815,114) following escalation periods. In all but one enforcement state (Louisiana), escalation periods were associated with downturns that diverged from trends in the rest of the US.

The historical record, dating back to 1983 (when all CPS variables used in this analysis were first available), further suggests that the month-to-month private sector work downturns in enforcement states this year were out of the ordinary. The recent downturns in Tennessee, Illinois and Washington, D.C., had few comparisons, while those in California and Oregon were unprecedented. Findings indicate that ongoing federal immigration enforcement escalations are having negative consequences on private sector work, and suggest the need for policy interventions to mitigate such negative economic consequences.

## BACKGROUND

The second Trump administration has been marked by escalated immigration enforcement actions, with profound implications for civil rights and the American economy. On September 12, 2024, while on the campaign trail, Trump claimed that if he were elected “We’re going to have the largest deportation [initiative] in the history of our country” (Alvarez 2024). On January 20, 2025, the day he entered office, Trump signed an executive order initiating a mass deportation campaign (White House 2025).

On January 7, 2025—one day after Trump’s election was certified by the US Congress—the US Customs and Border Patrol initiated “Operation Return to Sender,” arresting 78 people at worksite raids in Kern County, of which only one had a criminal record (Olmos and Fry 2025). On February 26, Operation Return to Sender drew a complaint from the ACLU (with the United Farm Workers of America as a plaintiff) requesting a court order to prevent unconstitutional targeting of farmworkers and day laborers on the basis of race (ACLU Southern California 2025a).

By April 30, President Trump was on track to deport half a million persons in 2025—merely half of the Trump administration’s stated goal, and substantially fewer than the 685,000 that the Biden Administration had deported in the final year of his presidency (Chishti and Bush-Joseph 2025).

Starting in May, however, the Trump administration initiated several escalated immigration enforcement actions across several states to increase the number of deportations. These tactics included: sending scores of federal agents to certain cities/ states (a “surge”), coordinating

federal immigration enforcement with local police to stop and detain people living in Latino neighborhoods (a “dragnet”), and deploying the National Guard (with or without a state’s consent). In the following paragraphs, we outline the periods of major escalations in six US states and the District of Columbia (see also Table 1.1, next page).

On the night of May 3, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal (ICE) carried out the first “targeted enforcement operation” of Trump’s second presidency in Nashville, Tennessee (e.g. McCall 2025). Immigrant rights leaders noted this was the first time an enforcement operation targeted a non-border state in such a way (Crampton 2025). Critics questioned the constitutionality of the operation, suggesting that the operation had targeted residents on the basis of race (Adams, Puente and Lathan 2025).

In response to an overall low number of deportations, on June 6, 2025, the federal administration escalated enforcement by ordering US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers to carry out indiscriminate workplace raids and arrests in Los Angeles (Hesson and Cooke 2025). The raids were immediately met by largely peaceful protests. On June 7, however, President Trump ordered the deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops to quell the protests (Hernandez and Futterman 2025). As a result of the Los Angeles enforcement actions, many Angelenos avoided work, school, and other public spaces, leading to declines in consumption, business, work, and employment (Wick 2025). Protests broke out nationally against the escalation in federal immigration enforcement.

**Table 1.1 Federal Immigration Enforcement Escalations, by State**

| State      | Epicenter                  | Operation               | Enforcement Escalation            | Dates                     |
|------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Tennessee  | Nashville                  | Flood the Zone          | ICE/ highway patrol coordination  | May 3- May 10, 2025       |
| Tennessee  | Memphis                    | Memphis Safe Task Force | Surge of federal agents           | Sep 29, 2025- Present     |
| Tennessee  | Memphis                    |                         | National Guard deployment         | Oct 10, 2025- Present     |
| California | Los Angeles/ several areas | No name                 | Roving patrols/ workplace raids   | Jun 6- Jul 11, 2025       |
| California | Los Angeles/ several areas |                         | Reinstatement of roving patrols   | Sep 8, 2025- Present      |
| California | Los Angeles                | No name                 | National Guard deployment         | Jun 7, 2025- Jan 21, 2026 |
| Oregon     | Portland                   | No name                 | ICE deployment of chemical agents | Jun 14- Oct 4, 2025       |
| D.C.       |                            | No name                 | Federalization of police          | Aug 11- Sep 10, 2025      |
| D.C.       |                            | No name                 | National Guard deployment         | Aug 11- Present           |
| Illinois   | Chicago                    | Midway Blitz            | Surge of federal agents           | Sep 9- Present            |
| Louisiana  | New Orleans/ Baton Rouge   | Catahoula Crunch        | Surge of 250 federal CBP agents   | Dec 3, 2025- January 9    |
| Louisiana  | New Orleans                | No name                 | National Guard deployment         | Dec 30, 2025- Present     |
| Minnesota  | Minneapolis- Saint Paul    | Metro Surge             | Surge of federal agents           | Dec 4, 2025- Present      |
| Minnesota  | Minneapolis- Saint Paul    |                         | 2,000 additional agents           | Jan 6, 2026- Present      |

**Table 1.2 Escalation Periods, by Enforcement State, February 2025-January 2026**

| State      | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Jan |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Tennessee  |     |     |     | x   | x   |     |     |     | x   | x   |     |     |
| California |     |     |     |     | x   | x   |     | x   |     |     |     |     |
| Oregon     |     |     |     |     | x   | x   | x   | x   |     |     |     |     |
| D.C.       |     |     |     |     |     |     | x   |     |     |     |     |     |
| Illinois   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | x   | x   | x   |     |     |
| Louisiana  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | x   |     |
| Minnesota  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | x   | x   |

By July 11, a federal judge granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the federal government’s use of “roving patrols” or profiling based on race, language, location, and job to target immigrants (Fry and Olmos 2025). The TRO remained in effect from July 11 until September 8, 2025, when the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay, effectively suspending the order (ACLU Southern California 2025b and 2025c). The decision lifted the temporary protections that for a short time had limited immigration enforcement actions in California, permitting federal agents to resume workplace operations and raids.

As the constitutionality of immigration enforcement actions was litigated, such enforcement operations proliferated across several US states. In addition, protests—and local and federal agents’ actions against those protesters—also proliferated.

In Portland, Oregon, months of ongoing protests began on June 14, when residents rallied against the President’s deployment of the National Guard in Los Angeles. On multiple occasions, local or federal agents deployed chemical munitions against protesters. The protests continued with various escalations and de-escalations

through September, and only after an October 5 judge’s ruling blocking any National Guard from entering Oregon did protests die down (Sparling 2025).

On August 11, following the deployment of the National Guard in California, Trump signed an Executive Order (“Declaring a Crime Emergency in the District of Columbia”) federalizing the Washington D.C. police and deploying the National Guard. The executive order expired after 30 days, although the National Guard remains in D.C.

On September 6, Trump attempted to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, and significant demonstrations followed. On September 8, Trump announced Operation Midway Blitz in and around Chicago (Aleaziz and Bosman 2025). Tensions escalated with the ICE-related homicide of an immigrant on September 12, and culminated with a large, militarized raid on an apartment complex the night of October 3 (Hickman and Schiltz 2025; Hickman and Diaz 2025; Rless and Kirkos 2025). However, on October 9, a district judge blocked Trump from deploying the National Guard onto Chicago streets (Meisel 2025) and by late December the Supreme Court ruled against the President’s appeal (Marimow 2025, Hippensteel 2025).

On December 3, 2025, 250 federal Customs and Border Patrol Agents arrived in New Orleans under Operation Catahoula Crunch. Agents raided sites where day laborers gathered to look for work, and news reports suggested members of the undocumented immigrant community feared leaving home (Misick 2025a). But by January 9, federal agents assigned to Louisiana were abruptly re-assigned to Minnesota (Brook 2026).

On December 4, 2025, the Trump administration initiated Operation Metro Surge in the Twin Cities area (later expanding throughout Minnesota). On January 6, the Department of Homeland Security deployed 2,000 agents to Minnesota, calling it “the biggest immigration enforcement operation ever” (Santana and Balsamo 2026). Residents protested the escalation and were met with violence. This included an ICE officer killing a US citizen on January 7, 2026, setting off several more waves of protests and enforcement actions. A judge later declared that ICE had violated over 100 orders in January (Thebault et al. 2026).

While the federal administration attempts the largest deportation campaign in US history, questions remain about its potential effects on the US economy. In turn, this research report examines state-level changes in the number of private sector workers in those places targeted by federal immigration enforcement escalations: Tennessee, California, Oregon, Washington, D.C., Illinois, Louisiana, and Minnesota.

We examine how state-level changes in the number of private sector workers coincide with the timelines of state-level, targeted enforcement operations. We also examine how such changes compare with broader national trends. Lastly, we examine how

such changes compare with the broader historical record for each state. We ask, “During escalations in federal immigration enforcement, how does private sector employment change?”

## DATA AND METHODS

This report utilizes US Census Bureau-Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly data, as well as IPUMS CPS, which utilizes the same underlying CPS data while harmonizing for previous years (Flood et al. 2026). The CPS Basic Monthly is a representative survey with monthly responses from roughly 40,000 American households (United States Census Bureau 2024). While the ACS is the largest survey on American social and economic life, it is not available until more than a year after data is gathered. The CPS Basic Monthly is the largest dataset that provides insight into rapidly changing dynamics of work and employment among US residents, on a monthly basis.

We utilized CPS Basic Monthly data from January 2025 to January 2026. The survey is collected the week of the month on which the 19th falls and asks about the week of the 12th. For the purposes of this study, this week (or the previous week) often coincided with when a state-level immigration escalation was initiated.

Our analysis includes those currently employed (PREMPNOT=1), who reported working one or more hours at one or more jobs (PEHRACTT>0). Since citizenship is often a requirement for public sector employment, we expect the economic impact of immigration enforcement on noncitizen employment to be greatest in the private sector. Our analysis of “workers”

**Table 2.1 Change in Private Sector Workers, January 2025 versus January 2026**

|                    | Jan 2025    | Jan 2026    | Change    | % Change |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
| Enforcement States | 28,799,740  | 28,278,149  | -521,591  | -1.8%    |
| Rest of the US     | 101,373,578 | 102,536,319 | 1,162,741 | 1.1%     |
| US Total           | 130,173,318 | 130,814,468 | 641,150   | 0.5%     |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, January 2025 and January 2026.

focused on private sector employment—including employment in the private, for-profit sector (PEIO1COW=4) and the private, non-profit sector (PEIO1COW=5)—as well as self-employed workers, not incorporated (PEIO1COW=7), such as those not formally registering a business as a separate legal entity from their own labor. We analyzed these trends among workers in different states, including Washington, D.C. (GESTFIPS). We weighted data with the CPS’ final weight (PWSSWGT/10,000).

We also utilized IPUMS-CPS Basic Monthly data for 1983-2026, the only years which had data on all variables we used (self-employed, non-incorporated was not available before 1983). While IPUMS CPS names variables differently than those in the US Census Bureau’s CPS databases, the relevant variables contained the same data. For analysis of IPUMS CPS data we used the following variables: Employment Status (EMPSTAT), Class of Worker (CLASSWKR), State (STATEFIP), and weighted data with the Final Basic Weight (WTFINL).

## FINDINGS

### *US Private Sector Jobs 2025-2026*


The US economy added relatively few private sector jobs during President Trump’s

first year of his second term. An estimated 130,173,318 US residents worked in the private sector on January 11-17, 2025, just before Trump assumed office (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). During the week of January 12-18, 2026, about 130,814,468 persons had worked in the private sector (see Table 2.1). In one year, an additional 641,150 had worked in the private sector, a total growth of 0.5% for the US private sector economy (see Table 2.1).

Yet the six US states (and D.C.) targeted by one of the President’s largest campaign promises have experienced a largely divergent economic trajectory from the rest of the country. From January 2025 to January 2026, the places that were the focal point of President Trump’s campaign promise for the largest deportation campaign in US history—Tennessee, California, Oregon, Washington D.C., Illinois, Minnesota and Louisiana—experienced a collective 1.8% decline in the number of people reporting work in the private sector (See Table 2.1).

In Trump’s first year in office, in Washington D.C. and the six states that had experienced escalations in federal immigration enforcement (herein referred to as “enforcement states”), the number of persons reporting private sector work had

**Figure 2.1 Change in Private Sector Workers, January 2025 versus January 2026**



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, January 2025 and January 2026.

declined from 28,799,740 to 28,278,149 (see Table 2.1). In contrast, the remaining 44 states (“rest of the US”) less formally targeted by federal immigration enforcement experienced a 1.1% increase in the number of persons reporting work in the private sector, from 101,373,578 to 102,536,319 (See Table 2.1).

The divergent economic trajectories between enforcement states and the rest of the US is displayed in Figure 2.2. Private sector job growth was very similar between enforcement states (0.1%) and the rest of the US (0.3%) from January 2026 to February 2026, the first month after Trump took office (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). From January 2026 to March 2026, the second month after Trump took office, private sector job growth continued to increase for both enforcement states (1.4%) and the rest of the US (0.5%) (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). (In this section, comparisons are based on a January 2025 baseline, when Trump entered office.)

The private sector job markets of enforcement states and the rest of the US began to diverge by April 2025, however. In April 2025, enforcement states experienced a decline to a 0.6% overall growth (down from 1.4% in March 2025), while the rest of the US continued to experience growth (from 0.5% to 1.5% between March and April 2025) (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2).

While figures increased some months and decreased in others, by January 2026 the rest of the US still had an estimated 1.1% more private sector jobs than when Trump’s presidency began in January 2025. The same pattern did not hold for enforcement states. In enforcement states, private sector jobs declined for most months. In July 2025, enforcement states had an estimated -1.6% fewer jobs than in January 2025, and by January 2026 the estimates remained similarly negative at -1.8% (again compared with the same January 2025 baseline) (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2).

**Figure 2.2 Change in Private Sector Workers, Feb 2025-Jan 2026 (Jan 2025 baseline)**




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, January 2025-January 2026.

**Table 2.2 Change in Private Sector Workers, January 2025-January 2026**

|          | Enforcement States | % Change from Jan 2025 | Rest of the US | % Change from Jan 2025 |
|----------|--------------------|------------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Jan 2025 | 28,799,740         | ----                   | 101,373,578    | ----                   |
| Feb 2025 | 28,827,728         | 0.1%                   | 101,653,861    | 0.3%                   |
| Mar 2025 | 29,200,087         | 1.4%                   | 101,861,005    | 0.5%                   |
| Apr 2025 | 28,976,733         | 0.6%                   | 102,855,552    | 1.5%                   |
| May 2025 | 28,888,286         | 0.3%                   | 102,688,741    | 1.3%                   |
| Jun 2025 | 28,613,740         | -0.6%                  | 103,061,269    | 1.7%                   |
| Jul 2025 | 28,330,916         | -1.6%                  | 103,178,747    | 1.8%                   |
| Aug 2025 | 28,908,553         | 0.4%                   | 101,884,085    | 0.5%                   |
| Sep 2025 | 28,681,631         | -0.4%                  | 102,570,111    | 1.2%                   |
| Nov 2025 | 28,833,192         | 0.1%                   | 103,113,579    | 1.7%                   |
| Dec 2025 | 28,461,074         | -1.2%                  | 103,004,785    | 1.6%                   |
| Jan 2026 | 28,278,149         | -1.8%                  | 102,536,319    | 1.1%                   |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, January 2025-January 2026.

**Figure 3.1 Monthly Change in Private Sector Workers Before, During, and After Escalation Periods, Jan 2025-2026**



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, January 2025-January 2026.

**Table 3.1 Change in Private Sector Workers, by enforcement month and state, Jan 2025-2026**

|                    | Enforcement States | Rest of the US |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Before Escalations | 176,992            |                |
| Escalation Periods | -1,513,699         |                |
| After Escalations  | 815,114            |                |
| Total              | -521,593           | 1,162,741      |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, January 2025-January 2026.

The differences in private sector job growth between enforcement states and the rest of the US were most striking in the June 2025 to July 2025 period, and December 2025 to January 2026 period (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2). These time periods correspond

with the greatest spectacles of escalated federal immigration enforcement actions—the federalization of the National Guard in Los Angeles and the murder of a US citizen in Minnesota—during the second Trump administration’s first year in office.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> While the late September overnight raid of a Chicago apartment was also a notable display, there exists no CPS data for the month of October 2025.

**Table 3.2 Change in Private Sector Workers, by state, April 2025-January 2026**

|                 | May          | Jun          | Jul          | Aug          | Sep          | Nov          | Dec          | Jan          |
|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Tennessee       | <b>-0.7%</b> | <b>-6.0%</b> | 4.1%         | 6.1%         | -2.8%        | <b>-1.4%</b> | 0.4%         | -3.4%        |
| California      | 1.3%         | <b>-3.1%</b> | <b>-1.9%</b> | 4.0%         | <b>-1.9%</b> | 2.4%         | -1.5%        | -0.5%        |
| Oregon          | -2.2%        | <b>-3.1%</b> | 2.9%         | <b>-4.8%</b> | <b>-2.7%</b> | 3.0%         | -3.0%        | 0.8%         |
| Washington D.C. | -2.5%        | 12.1%        | 1.2%         | <b>-7.4%</b> | 4.0%         | 5.0%         | 6.0%         | -3.7%        |
| Illinois        | -2.9%        | 4.2%         | -2.1%        | 0.7%         | <b>2.0%</b>  | <b>-2.3%</b> | -1.4%        | 0.5%         |
| Louisiana       | 1.5%         | 1.6%         | -2.7%        | 0.5%         | 0.9%         | 2.9%         | <b>0.6%</b>  | -0.6%        |
| Minnesota       | -3.8%        | 6.2%         | -0.5%        | -4.4%        | 2.1%         | -5.9%        | <b>-2.9%</b> | <b>-1.7%</b> |
| Rest of the US  | -0.2%        | 0.4%         | 0.1%         | -1.3%        | 0.7%         | 0.5%         | -0.1%        | -0.5%        |

Note: Bolded figures represent months of escalated federal immigration enforcement actions.

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, April 2025-January 2026.

### *States of Enforcement*

In the first year of the second Trump administration, the six states and federal district that comprise enforcement states experienced an overall downturn of -521,593 private sector workers (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). This included gains and losses before, during and after periods of escalation. The number of persons reporting work in the private sector in enforcement states, before escalations occurred, was 176,992 higher than during the January 2025 baseline period (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1).

In enforcement states during periods of escalated immigration enforcement, a total of -1,513,699 fewer persons reported having worked in the private sector compared with the previous month (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1).

For the period after escalations declined (either through the expiration of an order, a court order intervening, or a reduction in


activity—about two months in many cases), enforcement states experienced a total increase of 815,114 persons reporting work in the private sector compared with the month prior (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1).

In contrast, the rest of the US experienced a year-to-year gain of 1,162,741 persons reporting work in the private sector between January 2025 and January 2026 (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1).

### *Tennessee*

On the night of Saturday May 3, 2025, to Sunday May 4, 2025, Tennessee Highway Patrol officers assigned to Operation Flood the Zone pulled someone over “every two minutes and 20 seconds, on average” in South Nashville’s largely Latino neighborhoods (Taylor and Elliot 2025). This operation continued for about a week and was Nashville’s most significant escalation in immigration enforcement in 2025.

Figure 3.2 Change in Private Sector Workers, Tennessee vs Rest of the US (April-May, May-June, September-November 2025)




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, April-June 2025.

Concurrently, between April and May 2025, the month-to-month number of Tennesseans reporting having worked in the private sector declined by -0.7%, and by June the number dropped an additional -6.0% (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2). This contrasts with respective figures for the rest of the US in May (-0.2%) and in June (0.4%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2).

Long after the raids in May, Tennessee’s private sector job market rebounded in July (4.1%) and August (6.1%) before declining in September (-2.8%) (see Table 3.2). Yet, Memphis also experienced an escalation in federal enforcement that followed with subsequent declines in private sector jobs. On September 15, Trump escalated his deportation campaign strategy by signing an Executive Order to initiate the Memphis Safe Task Force and to deploy the National Guard (Gangitano 2025). The Memphis Safe Task Force began operations the week of September 29 (City of Memphis 2025), after which Tennessee’s private sector job market further declined in November (-1.4%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2), in contrast to the 0.5% growth in the rest of the US during the same period. The number of Tennessee’s private sector workers rebounded slightly in December (0.5%) before continuing a further downward trend in January (-3.4%).

Figure 3.3 Change in Private Sector Workers, California vs Rest of the US (May-June, June-July, and August-September 2025)



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, May-September 2025.

### California

California experienced private sector job growth in the first months of the Trump administration, before declining sharply and then only partially bouncing back. In California the number of people reporting private sector work grew in February (1.0%) and March (1.8%), before declining in April (-1.5%) and growing again in May (1.3%) (analysis not shown).

The most significant disruption to California’s economy occurred in June, when the Trump administration escalated immigration enforcement in Los Angeles with workplace raids and roving patrols.

Within days, following protests, Trump ordered California’s National Guard federalized and deployed. Following those actions, California’s private sector jobs recorded a -3.1% decline in June (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3). As actions escalated, California experienced an additional 1.9% decline in July (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3). This contrasts sharply with respective figures for the rest of the US in June (0.4%) and July (0.1%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3).

After a court order on July 11 placed a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on

roving patrols, however, California’s private sector jobs bounced back 4.0% (see Table 3.2). Yet, after the US Supreme Court placed a stay on the TRO, California’s private sector jobs declined by -1.9% in September (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3). Again, this contrasts with respective figures for the rest of the US in September (0.7%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3).


While the state’s private sector job market increased in November (2.4%), it decreased in December (-1.5%) and January (-0.5%) (see Table 3.2) and currently remains at 14.8 million workers—a level very similar to those during the initial disruption in June and during September (analysis not shown).

### *Oregon*

Oregon’s economy also appeared to have been disrupted, despite no formal initiative targeting the state for escalated immigration enforcement. On June 4, federal officials detained three protestors for blocking a van (Amaro 2025). Then, starting on June 11, 2025, several residents of Portland, Oregon, began protesting President Trump’s federalization of the National Guard and escalations in federal immigration enforcement (Immergut 2025). In several instances escalations occurred between protestors and police, resulting in the use of toxic, chemical munitions, such as pepper balls, pepper spray, and smoke grenades against protestors (e.g. City of Portland 2025).

Corresponding with the immigration enforcement escalation-related disruptions, Oregon experienced a 3.1% decline in the number of people reporting having worked in the private sector between May and June 2025 (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 Change in Private Sector Workers, Oregon vs Rest of the US (May-June, June-July, July-August and August-September 2025)




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, May-September 2025.

Large public demonstrations continued and were met with aggressive policing tactics throughout July, August and early September. During that time, private sector jobs rebounded in July (2.9%), before declining sharply in August (-4.8%) and September (-2.7%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4). The respective figures for the rest of the US were much more positive for June (0.4%), July (0.1%), August (-1.3%) and September (0.7%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4).

After President Trump ordered the National Guard to be federalized and deployed in Oregon on September 27 and 28, a federal district judge temporarily blocked the deployment in early October and then permanently in early November (Cheney and Gerstein 2025; Wilson and Wiley 2025). Private sector jobs increased in November (3.0%) before decreasing in December (-3.0%) and then increasing slightly again in January (0.8%) (see Table 3.2).

Thus, the downturn in the number of persons reporting private sector work in Oregon coincided with escalations in protesting and policing, while the number remained relatively constant between September and January, corresponding with legal action that blocked what would have been an escalation in federal enforcement.

Figure 3.5 Change in Private Sector Workers, DC vs Rest of the US (July-August 2025)



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, July-August 2025.

### Washington D.C.

Washington D.C.’s private sector jobs immediately took a downturn in August, following Trump’s signing of an Executive Order federalizing the Washington D.C. police and deploying the National Guard.


Private sector jobs declined -7.4% below levels recorded in July (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5). This was a far greater decline than that observed in the rest of the US for August (-1.3%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5).

The Executive Order expired after 30 days, and the number of D.C. private sector jobs increased thereafter in September (4.0%), November (5.0%), and December (6.0%) before declining again in January (-3.7%) (see Table 3.1). However, while local control of the police was returned the National Guard remains in D.C. today.

### Illinois

Only days after early September escalations (proposed National Guard deployment and Operation Midway), the number of Illinois residents reporting work in the private sector work increased by 2.0%. Yet near and after the end of the CPS reference week of September 7, Illinois experienced some of

Figure 3.6 Change in Private Sector Workers, Illinois vs Rest of the US (August-September and September-November 2025)




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, August-November 2025.

the most pronounced escalations in federal immigration enforcement actions (the ICE-related homicide of an immigrant on September 12, and the large, militarized overnight raid on an apartment complex on October 3). However, some of the most important data on the effect of federal escalations on the economy will never be recovered. Owing to a federal government shutdown, for the first time in its history the CPS did not collect data in October.

From what data does exist, we can estimate that Illinois’ private sector workforce participation from September to November (the peak of Operation Midway’s activity) declined by -2.3% (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6), and then another -1.4% in December (see Table 3.2). These declines were much greater than that observed in the rest of the US for the same time periods in November (0.5%) and December (0.1%) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6).

Concurrent with a district judge’s order blocking the President from deploying the National Guard onto Chicago streets (Meisel 2025), the number of Illinois’ private sector jobs increased slightly, by 0.5%, between December and January (see Table 3.2).

Figure 3.7 Change in Private Sector Workers, Louisiana vs Rest of the US (November 2025-December 2025)




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, December 2025-January 2026.

### Louisiana

Unlike other enforcement states, Louisiana did not appear to experience a decline in private sector work during a period of escalated immigration enforcement actions. On December 3, 2025, 250 federal Customs and Border Patrol Agents arrived in New Orleans under Operation Catahoula Crunch. Agents raided sites where day laborers gathered to look for work, and news reports suggested members of the undocumented immigrant community feared leaving home (Misick 2025a). By the second week of the operation, CBP agents shifted their focus to other communities in southeast Louisiana (Misick 2025b). We estimate an increase of 0.6% of persons reporting private sector work, in Louisiana, between November and December—better than the estimated -0.1% decline in the rest of the US (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.7).

On December 30, the National Guard was deployed to New Orleans (Cline and Brook 2025). Yet by January 9, about one month after the operation began, the more than 200 federal agents assigned to Louisiana were abruptly redeployed for Minnesota in what the Department of Homeland Security called “the biggest immigration enforcement operation ever” (Brook 2026).

Figure 3.8 Change in Private Sector Workers, Minnesota vs Rest of the US (November-December 2025 and December 2025-January 2026)



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of Current Population Survey- Basic Monthly Survey data, November 2025-January 2026.

### Minnesota


Minnesota experienced a downturn in persons working in the private sector, from the moment federal immigration enforcement escalated in the Twin Cities area in December to the present moment.

On December 4, 2025, the Trump administration initiated Operation Metro Surge, deploying a surge of federal agents in the Twin Cities area. During this time, the number of persons reporting private sector work in Minnesota declined -2.9% from November to December 2025, a much greater decline than the -0.1% in the rest of the US (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.8).

Residents of Minneapolis and surrounding areas protested the escalation and were met with extreme measures of aggressive policing. This led to an ICE officer killing a US citizen on January 7, 2026, setting off several more waves of protests and spectacles of escalated enforcement.


Concurrently, the number of persons in Minnesota reporting private sector work between December 2025 and January 2026 declined a further -1.7%, again below the rest of the US (-0.5%) for the same period (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.8).

Figure 4.1 Historical Apr-Jun Change in Private Sector Workers, Tennessee 1983-2025




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.2 Historical Sep-Nov Change in Private Sector Workers, Tennessee 1983-2025




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.3 Historical May-Jul Change in Private Sector Workers, California 1983-2025



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.4 Historical Aug-Sep Change in Private Sector Workers, California 1983-2025



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

### Historical Comparisons

The historical record, of private sector work across similar comparisons in previous years, indicates that nearly all changes observed during recent periods of escalation in enforcement states have few precedents. Tennessee’s April-June decline (-6.7%) was third-worst among forty-three years of data going back to 1983 (see Figure 4.1 and Appendix A), while its September-November decline (-1.4%) was thirteenth-worst (see Figure 4.2 and Appendix A).


California’s May-July decline (4.9%) was unprecedented, about 1.6 times that of 2014 (-3.0%) and 2015 (-3.0%), the next worst years on record (see Figure 4.3 and Appendix B). California’s August-September decline also far surpassed previous worst years on

record, 2024 (-1.4%), 1990 (-0.7%) and 2007 (-0.1%) (see Figure 4.4 and Appendix B).

Oregon’s May-September decline (-7.5%) was also unprecedented, much higher than the previous three worst years on record, 2019 (-5.8%), 2017 (-5.0%), and 2018 (-4.6%) (see Figure 4.5 and Appendix C).


Analysis of three other enforcement states indicated unusual, but not unprecedented declines in private sector work. Washington D.C.’s July-August decline (-7.4%) was the fifth-worst decline in forty-three years of data (see Figure 4.6 and Appendix D). Illinois’ September-November decline (-2.3%) was also fifth-worst on record (see Figure 4.7 and Appendix E). And Minnesota’s November-January decline (-4.6%) was tenth worst on record (see Table 4.9 and Appendix G).

Figure 4.5 Historical May-Sep Change in Private Sector Workers, Oregon 1983-2025




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.6 Historical Jul-Aug Change in Private Sector Workers, D.C. 1983-2025




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.7 Historical Sep-Nov Change in Private Sector Workers, Illinois 1983-2025




Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.8 Historical Nov-Dec Change in Private Sector Workers, Louisiana 1983-2025



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2025 data

Figure 4.9 Historical Nov-Jan Change in Private Sector Workers, Minnesota 1983-2026



Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey (CPS) Basic Monthly 1983-2026 data

Louisiana’s November-December stands alone among enforcement states as the only state experiencing growth during a period of enforcement escalation. From November to December 2025, Louisiana grew by 0.6% in the number of persons reporting private sector work. This was fifteenth-best among the forty-three years on record (see Table 4.8 and Appendix F).

In sum, during recent periods of escalated immigration enforcement actions, all but one enforcement state experienced unusually bad to unprecedented declines in month-to-month changes in private sector work, when compared with similar periods in existing data going back to 1983.

## CONCLUSION

Our analysis of CPS data suggests that escalated federal immigration enforcement actions are associated with declines in private sector work. During the first year of the second Trump administration, states that were targeted with escalated immigration enforcement actions (Tennessee, California, Oregon, Washington, D.C., Illinois, Louisiana and Minnesota) collectively experienced a -1.8% loss in persons having reported work in the private sector. This contrasts with a 1.1% increase in the rest of the US.

We found evidence that the change in the number of private sector workers was associated with periods of escalated immigration enforcement. Monthly changes in the number of private sector workers (measured against a January 2025 baseline) between enforcement states and the rest of the US were within about one percentage point from each other from February to May. Following the first targeted immigration enforcement operation in May, however, the figures sharply diverged for the rest of the year (except for one month).

Furthermore, the monthly change in private sector workers, in enforcement states, aligned with the periods of escalations within those states. Enforcement states collectively experienced a gain of 815,114 private sector workers in the months before each of their own respective targeted immigration enforcement operations began. During escalation periods, however, enforcement states experienced a decline of -1,513,699 private sector workers. Then, following periods of escalation, enforcement states added 815,114 private sector jobs.

Each state's cumulative private sector work declines, when compared with similar monthly data from the past forty-three years, in most cases appeared highly unusual or unprecedented. This included Tennessee's April-June (-6.7%) decline, California's May-July (-4.9%) and August-September (-1.9%) declines, Oregon's May-September decline (-7.5%), Washington D.C.'s July-August (-7.4%) decline, and Illinois' September-November (-2.3%) decline. In those six cases, four or fewer years (out of the past forty-three years) yielded similar or worse declines. Minnesota's still drastic November-January (-4.6%) decline was tenth-worst on record, and Tennessee's September-November (-1.4%) decline was thirteenth-worst on record. Only Louisiana's comparatively brief immigration enforcement escalation in December was not associated with decline.

As investment in and expansion of immigration enforcement endures, we anticipate continuing to see the effects of enforcement actions on the economy. Last year, US Congress allocated an unprecedented \$85 billion annual budget for Immigration and Customs Enforcement operations and support to increase deportations; this was more than eight times the roughly \$10 billion annual allocations in recent years (Chappell 2026).

Furthermore, on September 5, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a final rule expanding the immigration and law enforcement activities of US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), including but not limited to detaining, issuing warrants for arrest and removal, arresting people who help with

immigrant entries deemed unlawful, initiating vehicle pursuits and apprehensions, carrying firearms, and using “non-deadly and deadly force, when necessary.” Before this change, USCIS was primarily an administrative body dealing primarily with screening applications for immigration benefits.

To date, federal legislators have failed to pass policies mitigating the federal administration’s efforts to advance mass immigration enforcement operations. Moreover, while courts have generally ruled against the federalization of the National Guard, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay on a Temporary Restraining Order against roving patrols and racial profiling (ACLU Southern California 2025c). As a result, protecting immigrant workers’ rights—or mitigating violations of their rights—may require the policy innovation of states, municipalities, and employers.

Given that the Great Recession and COVID-19 pandemic are the most comparable examples of massive loss of work, state policymakers should consider how the current moment may require significant action on behalf of the state. In similar cases of massive economic disruption, such as the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic, lawmakers invested public resources for one-time stimulus, wage replacement, or disaster relief spending. Similarly, during escalations in immigration enforcement, policymakers might consider how to sustain the livelihoods of impacted working families—protecting the wellbeing of children living in undocumented or mixed-status households—while simultaneously infusing cash into the economy.

Lawmakers might consider extending access to the economic safety net on a wider scale to those affected directly or indirectly by immigration enforcement. States might, for example, create state-funded unemployment benefit systems for excluded workers ineligible for unemployment benefits, which would have a domino effect stimulating the local economies of communities most affected by escalated immigration enforcement and associated economic downturns.

The recent immigration enforcement escalations in several states reveal how states currently lack adequate economic safety net systems for excluded workers who cannot work—and the downstream effects of such disruptions. Given the unprecedented investment in Immigration and Customs Enforcement support and operations, and the historic magnitude of the effects of recent federal actions on several states’ private sector employment, state lawmakers should consider planning and developing economic stimulus and disaster packages for workers.

Since September 2025, federal immigration officers have shot thirteen persons, killing four persons, including both noncitizens and US citizens (Schuppe and Ortiz 2026). The killing of US citizen Alex Pretti, in Minnesota, came after the period of analysis in this report and was associated with major economic disruptions, illustrating the degree to which escalations in immigration enforcement actions continue to persist and disrupt the US economy. These events underscore the need for timely, state-level policy interventions to mitigate the negative effects of federal immigration enforcement on the economy.

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**Appendix A. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2025 (Tennessee)**

|      | Apr       | Jun       | Change   | % Change | Sep       | Nov       | Change   | % Change |
|------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| 1983 | 1,471,449 | 1,502,831 | 31,382   | 2.1%     | 1,596,925 | 1,642,236 | 45,311   | 2.8%     |
| 1984 | 1,440,385 | 1,579,647 | 139,262  | 9.7%     | 1,694,970 | 1,644,969 | -50,001  | -2.9%    |
| 1985 | 1,656,420 | 1,680,927 | 24,507   | 1.5%     | 1,605,770 | 1,676,862 | 71,092   | 4.4%     |
| 1986 | 1,695,577 | 1,739,081 | 43,504   | 2.6%     | 1,672,225 | 1,722,165 | 49,940   | 3.0%     |
| 1987 | 1,641,252 | 1,768,386 | 127,134  | 7.7%     | 1,763,439 | 1,797,901 | 34,462   | 2.0%     |
| 1988 | 1,688,671 | 1,737,743 | 49,072   | 2.9%     | 1,802,868 | 1,799,309 | -3,559   | -0.2%    |
| 1989 | 1,841,723 | 1,803,175 | -38,548  | -2.1%    | 1,937,671 | 1,907,487 | -30,184  | -1.6%    |
| 1990 | 1,777,479 | 1,840,188 | 62,709   | 3.5%     | 1,853,250 | 1,826,133 | -27,117  | -1.5%    |
| 1991 | 1,820,391 | 1,894,263 | 73,872   | 4.1%     | 1,904,512 | 1,921,011 | 16,499   | 0.9%     |
| 1992 | 1,779,780 | 1,884,313 | 104,533  | 5.9%     | 1,895,409 | 1,947,862 | 52,453   | 2.8%     |
| 1993 | 1,787,090 | 1,908,657 | 121,567  | 6.8%     | 1,987,088 | 2,024,089 | 37,001   | 1.9%     |
| 1994 | 2,115,969 | 2,018,474 | -97,495  | -4.6%    | 2,038,706 | 2,192,775 | 154,069  | 7.6%     |
| 1995 | 2,068,884 | 2,143,893 | 75,009   | 3.6%     | 2,076,135 | 2,135,209 | 59,074   | 2.8%     |
| 1996 | 2,075,261 | 2,084,741 | 9,480    | 0.5%     | 2,107,081 | 2,134,532 | 27,451   | 1.3%     |
| 1997 | 2,084,006 | 1,988,707 | -95,299  | -4.6%    | 2,044,206 | 2,118,833 | 74,627   | 3.7%     |
| 1998 | 2,145,660 | 2,090,478 | -55,182  | -2.6%    | 2,122,875 | 2,134,691 | 11,816   | 0.6%     |
| 1999 | 2,210,108 | 2,334,370 | 124,262  | 5.6%     | 2,136,222 | 2,143,663 | 7,441    | 0.3%     |
| 2000 | 2,240,880 | 2,305,936 | 65,056   | 2.9%     | 2,233,968 | 2,192,653 | -41,315  | -1.8%    |
| 2001 | 2,340,566 | 2,204,355 | -136,211 | -5.8%    | 2,207,235 | 2,195,275 | -11,960  | -0.5%    |
| 2002 | 2,311,664 | 2,268,865 | -42,799  | -1.9%    | 2,148,276 | 2,233,640 | 85,364   | 4.0%     |
| 2003 | 2,245,316 | 2,200,864 | -44,452  | -2.0%    | 2,105,875 | 2,155,277 | 49,402   | 2.3%     |
| 2004 | 2,273,077 | 2,194,117 | -78,960  | -3.5%    | 2,107,697 | 2,174,562 | 66,865   | 3.2%     |
| 2005 | 2,280,602 | 2,178,239 | -102,363 | -4.5%    | 2,278,335 | 2,216,715 | -61,620  | -2.7%    |
| 2006 | 2,248,286 | 2,331,519 | 83,233   | 3.7%     | 2,338,256 | 2,400,886 | 62,630   | 2.7%     |
| 2007 | 2,309,088 | 2,377,103 | 68,015   | 2.9%     | 2,360,278 | 2,377,635 | 17,357   | 0.7%     |
| 2008 | 2,316,136 | 2,340,111 | 23,975   | 1.0%     | 2,335,170 | 2,267,552 | -67,618  | -2.9%    |
| 2009 | 2,137,813 | 2,234,705 | 96,892   | 4.5%     | 2,218,775 | 2,137,634 | -81,141  | -3.7%    |
| 2010 | 2,278,296 | 2,277,341 | -955     | 0.0%     | 2,337,483 | 2,229,042 | -108,441 | -4.6%    |
| 2011 | 2,261,522 | 2,251,634 | -9,888   | -0.4%    | 2,279,433 | 2,325,963 | 46,530   | 2.0%     |
| 2012 | 2,280,478 | 2,424,744 | 144,266  | 6.3%     | 2,273,735 | 2,351,147 | 77,412   | 3.4%     |
| 2013 | 2,249,516 | 2,342,990 | 93,474   | 4.2%     | 2,222,239 | 2,245,747 | 23,508   | 1.1%     |
| 2014 | 2,458,299 | 2,260,273 | -198,026 | -8.1%    | 2,287,454 | 2,340,607 | 53,153   | 2.3%     |
| 2015 | 2,582,915 | 2,359,824 | -223,091 | -8.6%    | 2,297,605 | 2,383,385 | 85,780   | 3.7%     |
| 2016 | 2,519,894 | 2,465,313 | -54,581  | -2.2%    | 2,517,755 | 2,452,687 | -65,068  | -2.6%    |
| 2017 | 2,568,134 | 2,447,157 | -120,977 | -4.7%    | 2,717,037 | 2,565,288 | -151,749 | -5.6%    |
| 2018 | 2,617,197 | 2,569,974 | -47,223  | -1.8%    | 2,538,458 | 2,680,417 | 141,959  | 5.6%     |
| 2019 | 2,735,407 | 2,591,254 | -144,153 | -5.3%    | 2,599,681 | 2,616,927 | 17,246   | 0.7%     |
| 2020 | 2,081,969 | 2,349,980 | 268,011  | 12.9%    | 2,576,044 | 2,702,997 | 126,953  | 4.9%     |
| 2021 | 2,699,491 | 2,672,424 | -27,067  | -1.0%    | 2,568,210 | 2,727,762 | 159,552  | 6.2%     |
| 2022 | 2,738,870 | 2,622,407 | -116,463 | -4.3%    | 2,656,338 | 2,577,124 | -79,214  | -3.0%    |
| 2023 | 2,674,053 | 2,555,675 | -118,378 | -4.4%    | 2,789,208 | 2,618,246 | -170,962 | -6.1%    |
| 2024 | 2,701,364 | 2,630,372 | -70,992  | -2.6%    | 2,652,528 | 2,753,432 | 100,904  | 3.8%     |
| 2025 | 2,815,464 | 2,626,099 | -189,365 | -6.7%    | 2,819,943 | 2,780,558 | -39,385  | -1.4%    |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2025 data

**Appendix B. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2025 (California)**

|      | May        | Jul        | Change    | % Change | Aug        | Sep        | Change   | % Change |
|------|------------|------------|-----------|----------|------------|------------|----------|----------|
| 1983 | 8,800,364  | 8,840,756  | 40,392    | 0.5%     | 8,704,923  | 8,970,882  | 265,959  | 3.1%     |
| 1984 | 9,280,660  | 9,302,173  | 21,513    | 0.2%     | 9,330,964  | 9,309,672  | -21,292  | -0.2%    |
| 1985 | 9,288,470  | 9,489,460  | 200,990   | 2.2%     | 9,353,849  | 9,443,882  | 90,033   | 1.0%     |
| 1986 | 9,862,398  | 9,816,179  | -46,219   | -0.5%    | 10,045,110 | 10,071,535 | 26,425   | 0.3%     |
| 1987 | 10,384,961 | 10,396,979 | 12,018    | 0.1%     | 10,306,277 | 10,253,583 | -52,694  | -0.5%    |
| 1988 | 10,578,891 | 10,676,920 | 98,029    | 0.9%     | 10,569,768 | 10,886,604 | 316,836  | 3.0%     |
| 1989 | 10,796,371 | 10,940,122 | 143,751   | 1.3%     | 10,877,387 | 10,877,950 | 563      | 0.0%     |
| 1990 | 11,796,307 | 11,587,543 | -208,764  | -1.8%    | 11,451,670 | 11,374,009 | -77,661  | -0.7%    |
| 1991 | 11,166,307 | 11,077,794 | -88,513   | -0.8%    | 11,224,547 | 11,422,535 | 197,988  | 1.8%     |
| 1992 | 11,196,713 | 11,185,322 | -11,391   | -0.1%    | 11,080,936 | 11,173,158 | 92,222   | 0.8%     |
| 1993 | 11,300,634 | 11,144,563 | -156,071  | -1.4%    | 10,942,930 | 10,952,301 | 9,371    | 0.1%     |
| 1994 | 11,268,371 | 11,173,465 | -94,906   | -0.8%    | 11,292,042 | 11,380,646 | 88,604   | 0.8%     |
| 1995 | 10,973,967 | 11,460,310 | 486,343   | 4.4%     | 11,430,868 | 11,825,542 | 394,674  | 3.5%     |
| 1996 | 11,381,139 | 11,705,789 | 324,650   | 2.9%     | 11,886,715 | 12,048,082 | 161,367  | 1.4%     |
| 1997 | 12,124,852 | 12,142,996 | 18,144    | 0.1%     | 12,197,464 | 12,186,866 | -10,598  | -0.1%    |
| 1998 | 12,612,008 | 12,558,650 | -53,358   | -0.4%    | 12,203,998 | 12,467,247 | 263,249  | 2.2%     |
| 1999 | 12,741,464 | 12,651,616 | -89,848   | -0.7%    | 12,553,213 | 12,910,292 | 357,079  | 2.8%     |
| 2000 | 12,905,016 | 12,933,533 | 28,517    | 0.2%     | 13,018,857 | 13,239,786 | 220,929  | 1.7%     |
| 2001 | 13,035,043 | 13,077,964 | 42,921    | 0.3%     | 12,964,038 | 13,152,118 | 188,080  | 1.5%     |
| 2002 | 12,507,795 | 12,505,624 | -2,171    | 0.0%     | 12,399,145 | 12,866,970 | 467,825  | 3.8%     |
| 2003 | 13,031,862 | 13,184,193 | 152,331   | 1.2%     | 12,874,279 | 13,430,237 | 555,958  | 4.3%     |
| 2004 | 13,267,794 | 13,121,244 | -146,550  | -1.1%    | 13,117,294 | 13,355,763 | 238,469  | 1.8%     |
| 2005 | 13,223,721 | 13,469,520 | 245,799   | 1.9%     | 13,651,407 | 13,842,958 | 191,551  | 1.4%     |
| 2006 | 13,650,155 | 13,689,034 | 38,879    | 0.3%     | 13,473,798 | 13,700,309 | 226,511  | 1.7%     |
| 2007 | 13,827,047 | 13,839,375 | 12,328    | 0.1%     | 13,793,342 | 13,777,310 | -16,032  | -0.1%    |
| 2008 | 13,950,690 | 13,681,523 | -269,167  | -1.9%    | 13,563,699 | 13,639,151 | 75,452   | 0.6%     |
| 2009 | 12,907,587 | 12,741,145 | -166,442  | -1.3%    | 12,646,081 | 12,704,513 | 58,432   | 0.5%     |
| 2010 | 12,734,015 | 12,612,494 | -121,521  | -1.0%    | 12,541,958 | 12,591,479 | 49,521   | 0.4%     |
| 2011 | 12,574,955 | 12,699,671 | 124,716   | 1.0%     | 12,477,993 | 12,952,523 | 474,530  | 3.8%     |
| 2012 | 13,202,478 | 13,132,537 | -69,941   | -0.5%    | 13,003,186 | 13,178,236 | 175,050  | 1.3%     |
| 2013 | 13,662,037 | 13,331,331 | -330,706  | -2.4%    | 13,529,638 | 13,802,488 | 272,850  | 2.0%     |
| 2014 | 14,124,933 | 13,707,465 | -417,468  | -3.0%    | 13,934,331 | 14,169,199 | 234,868  | 1.7%     |
| 2015 | 14,742,355 | 14,303,587 | -438,768  | -3.0%    | 14,222,369 | 14,343,403 | 121,034  | 0.9%     |
| 2016 | 14,481,602 | 14,821,064 | 339,462   | 2.3%     | 14,631,659 | 14,637,181 | 5,522    | 0.0%     |
| 2017 | 14,857,939 | 14,892,189 | 34,250    | 0.2%     | 14,816,902 | 15,339,542 | 522,640  | 3.5%     |
| 2018 | 15,083,714 | 15,208,906 | 125,192   | 0.8%     | 15,179,298 | 15,638,693 | 459,395  | 3.0%     |
| 2019 | 15,226,000 | 15,359,407 | 133,407   | 0.9%     | 15,345,562 | 15,845,965 | 500,403  | 3.3%     |
| 2020 | 11,604,843 | 12,884,843 | 1,280,000 | 11.0%    | 13,001,567 | 13,478,085 | 476,518  | 3.7%     |
| 2021 | 14,070,281 | 14,395,446 | 325,165   | 2.3%     | 14,288,833 | 14,672,769 | 383,936  | 2.7%     |
| 2022 | 14,887,433 | 14,750,308 | -137,125  | -0.9%    | 14,812,483 | 14,871,972 | 59,489   | 0.4%     |
| 2023 | 14,927,891 | 15,150,236 | 222,345   | 1.5%     | 14,782,127 | 14,886,635 | 104,508  | 0.7%     |
| 2024 | 14,910,754 | 14,971,845 | 61,091    | 0.4%     | 14,971,307 | 14,755,605 | -215,702 | -1.4%    |
| 2025 | 15,220,150 | 14,477,658 | -742,492  | -4.9%    | 15,055,568 | 14,773,195 | -282,373 | -1.9%    |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2025 data

**Appendix C. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2025 (Oregon)**

|      | May       | Sep       | Change   | % Change |
|------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| 1983 | 910,280   | 906,191   | -4,089   | -0.4%    |
| 1984 | 951,176   | 936,364   | -14,812  | -1.6%    |
| 1985 | 958,029   | 973,136   | 15,107   | 1.6%     |
| 1986 | 960,802   | 1,089,275 | 128,473  | 13.4%    |
| 1987 | 974,114   | 1,045,354 | 71,240   | 7.3%     |
| 1988 | 1,029,662 | 1,048,156 | 18,494   | 1.8%     |
| 1989 | 1,038,479 | 1,067,338 | 28,859   | 2.8%     |
| 1990 | 1,110,657 | 1,160,833 | 50,176   | 4.5%     |
| 1991 | 1,151,438 | 1,148,270 | -3,168   | -0.3%    |
| 1992 | 1,118,591 | 1,162,460 | 43,869   | 3.9%     |
| 1993 | 1,062,111 | 1,187,144 | 125,033  | 11.8%    |
| 1994 | 1,242,066 | 1,214,379 | -27,687  | -2.2%    |
| 1995 | 1,250,727 | 1,258,274 | 7,547    | 0.6%     |
| 1996 | 1,349,652 | 1,335,460 | -14,192  | -1.1%    |
| 1997 | 1,340,787 | 1,392,365 | 51,578   | 3.8%     |
| 1998 | 1,310,339 | 1,365,487 | 55,148   | 4.2%     |
| 1999 | 1,318,562 | 1,327,307 | 8,745    | 0.7%     |
| 2000 | 1,382,295 | 1,460,708 | 78,413   | 5.7%     |
| 2001 | 1,365,673 | 1,395,202 | 29,529   | 2.2%     |
| 2002 | 1,311,756 | 1,422,689 | 110,933  | 8.5%     |
| 2003 | 1,356,753 | 1,367,701 | 10,948   | 0.8%     |
| 2004 | 1,392,776 | 1,356,127 | -36,649  | -2.6%    |
| 2005 | 1,375,606 | 1,402,416 | 26,810   | 1.9%     |
| 2006 | 1,395,153 | 1,364,466 | -30,687  | -2.2%    |
| 2007 | 1,437,372 | 1,465,083 | 27,711   | 1.9%     |
| 2008 | 1,488,161 | 1,470,854 | -17,307  | -1.2%    |
| 2009 | 1,352,130 | 1,385,271 | 33,141   | 2.5%     |
| 2010 | 1,351,031 | 1,409,323 | 58,292   | 4.3%     |
| 2011 | 1,370,637 | 1,398,932 | 28,295   | 2.1%     |
| 2012 | 1,365,833 | 1,439,871 | 74,038   | 5.4%     |
| 2013 | 1,377,199 | 1,474,414 | 97,215   | 7.1%     |
| 2014 | 1,450,453 | 1,471,679 | 21,226   | 1.5%     |
| 2015 | 1,497,113 | 1,517,785 | 20,672   | 1.4%     |
| 2016 | 1,566,044 | 1,598,244 | 32,200   | 2.1%     |
| 2017 | 1,686,031 | 1,601,639 | -84,392  | -5.0%    |
| 2018 | 1,652,148 | 1,576,957 | -75,191  | -4.6%    |
| 2019 | 1,651,034 | 1,555,329 | -95,705  | -5.8%    |
| 2020 | 1,387,884 | 1,539,874 | 151,990  | 11.0%    |
| 2021 | 1,584,206 | 1,623,839 | 39,633   | 2.5%     |
| 2022 | 1,691,282 | 1,637,979 | -53,303  | -3.2%    |
| 2023 | 1,621,117 | 1,597,132 | -23,985  | -1.5%    |
| 2024 | 1,620,601 | 1,642,052 | 21,451   | 1.3%     |
| 2025 | 1,691,459 | 1,564,553 | -126,906 | -7.5%    |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2025 data

**Appendix D. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2025 (District of Columbia)**

|      | Jul     | Aug     | Change  | % Change |
|------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| 1983 | 184,838 | 179,317 | -5,521  | -3.0%    |
| 1984 | 187,532 | 188,283 | 751     | 0.4%     |
| 1985 | 184,151 | 173,884 | -10,267 | -5.6%    |
| 1986 | 178,593 | 177,058 | -1,535  | -0.9%    |
| 1987 | 199,307 | 197,357 | -1,950  | -1.0%    |
| 1988 | 206,980 | 199,708 | -7,272  | -3.5%    |
| 1989 | 199,787 | 193,638 | -6,149  | -3.1%    |
| 1990 | 190,121 | 199,190 | 9,069   | 4.8%     |
| 1991 | 180,484 | 189,045 | 8,561   | 4.7%     |
| 1992 | 185,770 | 182,173 | -3,597  | -1.9%    |
| 1993 | 178,447 | 184,865 | 6,418   | 3.6%     |
| 1994 | 182,319 | 170,482 | -11,837 | -6.5%    |
| 1995 | 157,136 | 154,531 | -2,605  | -1.7%    |
| 1996 | 161,285 | 152,162 | -9,123  | -5.7%    |
| 1997 | 152,782 | 150,485 | -2,297  | -1.5%    |
| 1998 | 148,025 | 153,313 | 5,288   | 3.6%     |
| 1999 | 179,858 | 174,442 | -5,416  | -3.0%    |
| 2000 | 211,957 | 199,322 | -12,635 | -6.0%    |
| 2001 | 196,575 | 201,145 | 4,570   | 2.3%     |
| 2002 | 191,002 | 179,515 | -11,487 | -6.0%    |
| 2003 | 194,249 | 177,647 | -16,602 | -8.5%    |
| 2004 | 183,444 | 179,578 | -3,866  | -2.1%    |
| 2005 | 202,865 | 190,921 | -11,944 | -5.9%    |
| 2006 | 194,416 | 182,751 | -11,665 | -6.0%    |
| 2007 | 200,632 | 205,639 | 5,007   | 2.5%     |
| 2008 | 202,803 | 208,037 | 5,234   | 2.6%     |
| 2009 | 214,932 | 191,723 | -23,209 | -10.8%   |
| 2010 | 214,516 | 198,240 | -16,276 | -7.6%    |
| 2011 | 207,634 | 202,787 | -4,847  | -2.3%    |
| 2012 | 231,047 | 232,482 | 1,435   | 0.6%     |
| 2013 | 245,399 | 231,580 | -13,819 | -5.6%    |
| 2014 | 248,867 | 229,321 | -19,546 | -7.9%    |
| 2015 | 252,452 | 247,312 | -5,140  | -2.0%    |
| 2016 | 263,352 | 246,755 | -16,597 | -6.3%    |
| 2017 | 253,654 | 252,432 | -1,222  | -0.5%    |
| 2018 | 268,180 | 240,200 | -27,980 | -10.4%   |
| 2019 | 261,832 | 253,941 | -7,891  | -3.0%    |
| 2020 | 238,395 | 243,340 | 4,945   | 2.1%     |
| 2021 | 263,288 | 253,715 | -9,573  | -3.6%    |
| 2022 | 241,743 | 236,413 | -5,330  | -2.2%    |
| 2023 | 247,263 | 252,122 | 4,859   | 2.0%     |
| 2024 | 259,454 | 254,524 | -4,930  | -1.9%    |
| 2025 | 282,448 | 261,500 | -20,948 | -7.4%    |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2025 data

**Appendix E. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2025 (Illinois)**

|      | Sep       | Nov       | Change   | % Change |
|------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| 1983 | 3,999,131 | 4,098,753 | 99,622   | 2.5%     |
| 1984 | 4,078,232 | 4,291,463 | 213,231  | 5.2%     |
| 1985 | 4,137,106 | 4,195,728 | 58,622   | 1.4%     |
| 1986 | 4,252,519 | 4,260,088 | 7,569    | 0.2%     |
| 1987 | 4,360,540 | 4,310,761 | -49,779  | -1.1%    |
| 1988 | 4,477,873 | 4,519,510 | 41,637   | 0.9%     |
| 1989 | 4,498,037 | 4,480,980 | -17,057  | -0.4%    |
| 1990 | 4,394,914 | 4,519,119 | 124,205  | 2.8%     |
| 1991 | 4,448,887 | 4,318,803 | -130,084 | -2.9%    |
| 1992 | 4,505,770 | 4,622,561 | 116,791  | 2.6%     |
| 1993 | 4,402,493 | 4,630,268 | 227,775  | 5.2%     |
| 1994 | 4,517,454 | 4,589,731 | 72,277   | 1.6%     |
| 1995 | 4,688,882 | 4,798,293 | 109,411  | 2.3%     |
| 1996 | 4,703,373 | 4,783,838 | 80,465   | 1.7%     |
| 1997 | 4,664,683 | 4,783,250 | 118,567  | 2.5%     |
| 1998 | 4,725,657 | 4,924,809 | 199,152  | 4.2%     |
| 1999 | 5,060,739 | 5,123,236 | 62,497   | 1.2%     |
| 2000 | 5,196,279 | 5,156,755 | -39,524  | -0.8%    |
| 2001 | 5,111,383 | 4,999,776 | -111,607 | -2.2%    |
| 2002 | 4,967,659 | 5,090,137 | 122,478  | 2.5%     |
| 2003 | 4,852,436 | 5,054,696 | 202,260  | 4.2%     |
| 2004 | 5,010,309 | 4,996,071 | -14,238  | -0.3%    |
| 2005 | 4,979,504 | 5,182,481 | 202,977  | 4.1%     |
| 2006 | 5,316,167 | 5,325,963 | 9,796    | 0.2%     |
| 2007 | 5,361,457 | 5,222,605 | -138,852 | -2.6%    |
| 2008 | 4,916,344 | 4,867,658 | -48,686  | -1.0%    |
| 2009 | 4,645,682 | 4,664,977 | 19,295   | 0.4%     |
| 2010 | 4,970,862 | 4,933,755 | -37,107  | -0.7%    |
| 2011 | 4,944,418 | 4,845,916 | -98,502  | -2.0%    |
| 2012 | 5,042,840 | 4,910,969 | -131,871 | -2.6%    |
| 2013 | 5,087,623 | 5,046,729 | -40,894  | -0.8%    |
| 2014 | 5,093,033 | 5,009,724 | -83,309  | -1.6%    |
| 2015 | 5,163,236 | 4,951,165 | -212,071 | -4.1%    |
| 2016 | 5,104,363 | 5,063,268 | -41,095  | -0.8%    |
| 2017 | 4,937,746 | 5,117,204 | 179,458  | 3.6%     |
| 2018 | 5,066,342 | 5,015,364 | -50,978  | -1.0%    |
| 2019 | 5,104,628 | 5,224,525 | 119,897  | 2.3%     |
| 2020 | 4,712,259 | 4,769,985 | 57,726   | 1.2%     |
| 2021 | 4,904,540 | 5,010,027 | 105,487  | 2.2%     |
| 2022 | 5,112,820 | 5,079,287 | -33,533  | -0.7%    |
| 2023 | 4,993,333 | 5,323,557 | 330,224  | 6.6%     |
| 2024 | 4,955,756 | 5,221,109 | 265,353  | 5.4%     |
| 2025 | 5,255,872 | 5,134,015 | -121,857 | -2.3%    |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2025 data

**Appendix F. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2025 (Louisiana)**

|      | Nov       | Dec       | Change   | % Change |
|------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| 1983 | 1,275,153 | 1,271,696 | -3,457   | -0.3%    |
| 1984 | 1,399,502 | 1,301,249 | -98,253  | -7.0%    |
| 1985 | 1,305,246 | 1,282,421 | -22,825  | -1.7%    |
| 1986 | 1,307,754 | 1,253,598 | -54,156  | -4.1%    |
| 1987 | 1,291,505 | 1,235,261 | -56,244  | -4.4%    |
| 1988 | 1,317,945 | 1,355,931 | 37,986   | 2.9%     |
| 1989 | 1,361,890 | 1,333,414 | -28,476  | -2.1%    |
| 1990 | 1,349,701 | 1,358,892 | 9,191    | 0.7%     |
| 1991 | 1,346,713 | 1,339,124 | -7,589   | -0.6%    |
| 1992 | 1,338,117 | 1,217,398 | -120,719 | -9.0%    |
| 1993 | 1,311,307 | 1,321,460 | 10,153   | 0.8%     |
| 1994 | 1,337,025 | 1,259,473 | -77,552  | -5.8%    |
| 1995 | 1,404,987 | 1,388,327 | -16,660  | -1.2%    |
| 1996 | 1,476,641 | 1,505,128 | 28,487   | 1.9%     |
| 1997 | 1,509,176 | 1,490,295 | -18,881  | -1.3%    |
| 1998 | 1,548,690 | 1,563,182 | 14,492   | 0.9%     |
| 1999 | 1,551,394 | 1,527,344 | -24,050  | -1.6%    |
| 2000 | 1,418,862 | 1,463,818 | 44,956   | 3.2%     |
| 2001 | 1,392,489 | 1,380,264 | -12,225  | -0.9%    |
| 2002 | 1,362,205 | 1,389,641 | 27,436   | 2.0%     |
| 2003 | 1,561,629 | 1,489,714 | -71,915  | -4.6%    |
| 2004 | 1,602,374 | 1,584,284 | -18,090  | -1.1%    |
| 2005 | 1,429,595 | 1,435,343 | 5,748    | 0.4%     |
| 2006 | 1,430,714 | 1,373,967 | -56,747  | -4.0%    |
| 2007 | 1,557,448 | 1,571,027 | 13,579   | 0.9%     |
| 2008 | 1,528,445 | 1,499,135 | -29,310  | -1.9%    |
| 2009 | 1,513,967 | 1,413,895 | -100,072 | -6.6%    |
| 2010 | 1,524,363 | 1,499,520 | -24,843  | -1.6%    |
| 2011 | 1,488,301 | 1,454,199 | -34,102  | -2.3%    |
| 2012 | 1,524,263 | 1,501,516 | -22,747  | -1.5%    |
| 2013 | 1,607,496 | 1,597,269 | -10,227  | -0.6%    |
| 2014 | 1,600,196 | 1,633,410 | 33,214   | 2.1%     |
| 2015 | 1,532,859 | 1,588,075 | 55,216   | 3.6%     |
| 2016 | 1,533,187 | 1,553,262 | 20,075   | 1.3%     |
| 2017 | 1,615,817 | 1,627,506 | 11,689   | 0.7%     |
| 2018 | 1,576,883 | 1,592,811 | 15,928   | 1.0%     |
| 2019 | 1,572,698 | 1,558,544 | -14,154  | -0.9%    |
| 2020 | 1,459,199 | 1,480,549 | 21,350   | 1.5%     |
| 2021 | 1,511,979 | 1,500,913 | -11,066  | -0.7%    |
| 2022 | 1,657,682 | 1,570,941 | -86,741  | -5.2%    |
| 2023 | 1,594,856 | 1,575,059 | -19,797  | -1.2%    |
| 2024 | 1,514,981 | 1,506,169 | -8,812   | -0.6%    |
| 2025 | 1,628,811 | 1,638,139 | 9,328    | 0.6%     |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2025 data

**Appendix G. Change in Private Sector Workers, 1983-2026 (Minnesota)**

|           | Nov       | Jan       | Change   | % Change |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| 1983-1984 | 1,572,197 | 1,573,964 | 1,767    | 0.1%     |
| 1984-1985 | 1,734,267 | 1,602,659 | -131,608 | -7.6%    |
| 1985-1986 | 1,703,312 | 1,634,919 | -68,393  | -4.0%    |
| 1986-1987 | 1,732,418 | 1,638,297 | -94,121  | -5.4%    |
| 1987-1988 | 1,768,371 | 1,776,003 | 7,632    | 0.4%     |
| 1988-1989 | 1,833,659 | 1,785,458 | -48,201  | -2.6%    |
| 1989-1990 | 1,804,291 | 1,713,065 | -91,226  | -5.1%    |
| 1990-1991 | 1,874,451 | 1,857,217 | -17,234  | -0.9%    |
| 1991-1992 | 1,830,911 | 1,748,165 | -82,746  | -4.5%    |
| 1992-1993 | 1,827,771 | 1,839,875 | 12,104   | 0.7%     |
| 1993-1994 | 1,854,719 | 1,823,657 | -31,062  | -1.7%    |
| 1994-1995 | 1,995,927 | 2,008,422 | 12,495   | 0.6%     |
| 1995-1996 | 2,087,508 | 2,031,573 | -55,935  | -2.7%    |
| 1996-1997 | 2,006,995 | 1,970,618 | -36,377  | -1.8%    |
| 1997-1998 | 2,104,755 | 2,028,212 | -76,543  | -3.6%    |
| 1998-1999 | 2,143,588 | 2,016,041 | -127,547 | -6.0%    |
| 1999-2000 | 2,098,852 | 2,070,713 | -28,139  | -1.3%    |
| 2000-2001 | 2,213,933 | 2,194,507 | -19,426  | -0.9%    |
| 2001-2002 | 2,264,793 | 2,239,546 | -25,247  | -1.1%    |
| 2002-2003 | 2,298,905 | 2,132,990 | -165,915 | -7.2%    |
| 2003-2004 | 2,171,406 | 2,140,501 | -30,905  | -1.4%    |
| 2004-2005 | 2,181,109 | 2,186,471 | 5,362    | 0.2%     |
| 2005-2006 | 2,264,336 | 2,190,403 | -73,933  | -3.3%    |
| 2006-2007 | 2,345,598 | 2,177,704 | -167,894 | -7.2%    |
| 2007-2008 | 2,260,595 | 2,127,740 | -132,855 | -5.9%    |
| 2008-2009 | 2,178,748 | 2,125,231 | -53,517  | -2.5%    |
| 2009-2010 | 2,156,566 | 2,158,495 | 1,929    | 0.1%     |
| 2010-2011 | 2,208,685 | 2,173,081 | -35,604  | -1.6%    |
| 2011-2012 | 2,230,024 | 2,182,421 | -47,603  | -2.1%    |
| 2012-2013 | 2,299,687 | 2,277,522 | -22,165  | -1.0%    |
| 2013-2014 | 2,317,568 | 2,234,598 | -82,970  | -3.6%    |
| 2014-2015 | 2,344,523 | 2,288,825 | -55,698  | -2.4%    |
| 2015-2016 | 2,330,016 | 2,279,781 | -50,235  | -2.2%    |
| 2016-2017 | 2,337,210 | 2,326,659 | -10,551  | -0.5%    |
| 2017-2018 | 2,443,399 | 2,324,493 | -118,906 | -4.9%    |
| 2018-2019 | 2,527,906 | 2,342,568 | -185,338 | -7.3%    |
| 2019-2020 | 2,397,738 | 2,376,527 | -21,211  | -0.9%    |
| 2020-2021 | 2,368,137 | 2,282,204 | -85,933  | -3.6%    |
| 2021-2022 | 2,359,457 | 2,479,559 | 120,102  | 5.1%     |
| 2022-2023 | 2,341,745 | 2,428,774 | 87,029   | 3.7%     |
| 2023-2024 | 2,425,217 | 2,456,446 | 31,229   | 1.3%     |
| 2024-2025 | 2,453,019 | 2,526,494 | 73,475   | 3.0%     |
| 2025-2026 | 2,270,781 | 2,166,261 | -104,520 | -4.6%    |

Source: UC Merced Community and Labor Center analysis of IPUMS-CPS Current Population Survey, (CPS) Basic Monthly 1989-2026 data

**Research report prepared by** Edward Orozco Flores.

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## **MISSION STATEMENT**

The UC Merced Community and Labor Center conducts research and education on issues of community, labor and the environment, in the San Joaquin Valley and beyond.